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Henry David Thoreau once posed a Question which 
now challenges us as philosophers who would take up 
the issue of ethics and animals: "What sort of 
philosophers are we, who know absolutely nothing 
about the origin and destiny of cats?" This Question 
is a spur to us. Even if we object that the Question 
requires Qualification, that "absolutely nothing" is 
too strong. that philosophers have indeed considered 
the Question of the origins of animals, that we know 
something ...even if we object that Thoreau died too 
young (1862) to fully comprehend Darwin's Origin of 
the Species (1859)...the Question provokes us 
afresh. Thoreau's question both cites and sites a 
failure of philosophy and philosophers: because we 
know nothing of the origin and destiny of cats we fail 
as philosophers. The Question. further, situates the 
failure in one endeavor: knowing cats. A shift. a 
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movement away from the goal of self-knowledge by 
which philosophers have traditionally judged 
themselves takes place in Thoreau's Question. Even 
if we consider the situation of the Question unfair or 
rhetorically whimsical. it remains a spur. And 
notice that this last dichotomy is a movement in the 
Question itself: the Question is an absolute 
condemnation and absolutely whimsical. To engage in 
a reflection on ethics and animals, / must know 
something of their origins and destinies. 
Specifically, I must begin with cats. 
As a philosopher, I first of all wonder how I am to 
place myself in the situation of this 
Question ...whimsically or seriously. And being a 
philosopher, I of course Question the Question, an act 
which opens up a plethora of Questions which expand 
in ever-increllsing generality and then contract: 
must I become a biologist before I can undertake an 
ethical consideration of animals? Can knowledge of 
origins and destinies be necessary? By what 
methods, hypotheses, and assumptions am f •to 
proceed? Why cats? 
In the face of such questions as these. I propose 
a clarification of the situation in which Thoreau's 
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Question places us as philosophers who approach the 
issue of ethics and animals. I propose that Thoreau's 
Question about philosophy and the origin and destiny 
of cats places us within the framework of a central 
motif which philosophy adopts when it takes up 
Questions about animals. This central motif is that of 
production. and it entails the consideration of all the 
leitmotifs that are commensurate with it: necessity 
of design, the dominance of the end or goal or that 
for the sake of which it is, orchestrated behavior, 
and most fundamentally the origin of all of these, the 
logos. In response to Thoreau's Question, I ask 
nWhat sort of philosophy is it that asks Questions 
about origins and destinies of animals?" 
To achieve a clarification of the philosophical 
situation in which this Question is asked. I propose an 
examination of two texts: Aristotle's De Partlbus 
Animalium and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. 
Specifically, I undertake an exegesis of their 
respective discussions of the method for inquiring 
about the origins and destinies of animals. I show 
that in the matter of animals the method of both 
philosophers is structured and guided by the 
metaphor of human production. I further argue that 
in the thought of both philosophers the metaphor of 
productivity dominates their respective notions of 
logos. I conclude by arguing that, if we see that 
Thoreau's Question is itself a reflection of this 
dominant metaphor, it becomes important for a 
consideration of ethics and animals to ask.. "What 
does the dominance of the metaphor of human 
productivity imply for the ethical treatment of 
animals? What remains of the ~ that is not 
dominated by the metaphor of human productivity?" 
Provoked by Thoreau's Question. I now turn to 
the methodological consideration in Aristotle's 
treatise on The Parts of Animals. 
When Aristotle gives consideration to the 
Question of origin and destiny of animals, he lurns 
the question towards the larger issue of the causes 
in the generation of the works of nature. There are 
two such causes: the final cause and the motor 
cause. Of these, the former is the logos of the 
generated being. (My cat. Thomisina. is constantly 
on the lookout for a cat toy that is its own motor 
cause, so we shall leave the issue of efficient 
causality to her.) The logos provides us with the 
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proximate origin of anything made or produced, be it 
artifact or animal: 
There is the Cause for the sake of which the 
thing is formed, and the Cause to which the 
beginning of the motion is due, Therefore 
another point for us to decide is which of 
these two Causes stands first and which 
comes second. Clearly, the first which we 
call the "Final" Cause--that for the sake of 
which the thing is formed--since that is the 
logos of the thing--its rational ground, and 
the logos is always the beginning for 
products of Nature as well as for those of 
Art. (63gb 113-17) I 
Aristotle's argument stresses the univocal 
character of the final cause in the works of art and 
the works of nature. Both are products determined 
by their respective logoi, and the site of this 
determination is illustrated with the example given 
by Aristotle which follows this passage. To 
understand production in nature. Aristotle provides 
the analogy of the procedure of the builder and the 
physician, (Or is it an example? This determination 
remains an issue which my interpretation must 
confront.) The builder and the physician start by 
forming a definite picture of the end or goal which 
they hold to as the reason and justification for each 
successive step. As the builder and physician pursue 
a goal which determines the best means, so also 
works of nature have a good end and final cause 
which they hold to in producing the successive stages 
that move towards their end. Aristotle states that 
the final cause is even more dominant in nature than 
in works of art and is the usual way in which most 
writers on this SUbject define the origin, 
The final cause in works of nature is not always 
necessary, and, what necessity there is, is Qualified 
by various degrees. Absolute necessity only applies 
purely to eternal phenomena, The materials for 
production and the order in which the steps are taken 
to produce something are also necessary. Further. 
each necessary condition demands the pre-existence 
or previous production of a particular antecedent. 
But, of course, the existence of a particular 
antecedent does not make it necessary that the 
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particuler product come~ into exi~tence. With the 
question of the origin of animals, we have found 
layers of sequenced production, none of which needs 
to result in a product but all of which are necessary 
if the product is to exist. 
After a critique of Empedocles, Aristotle points 
out both the best and second-best procedures for 
investigating these Questions about the origins of 
animals: 
The fiUest mode. then, of treatment is to 
say. a man has such and such parts, because 
the conception of a man includes their 
presence, and because they are necessary 
conditions of his existence, or, if we cannot 
Quite say this, which would be best of all, 
then the next thing to it. namely, that it is 
either Quite impossible for him to exist 
without them, or, at any rate. that it is 
beUer for him that they should be there, 
and their existence involves the existence 
of other antecedents. Thus we should say. 
because man is an animal with such and such 
characteristics. therefore is the process of 
his development necessarily such as it is; 
and therefore is it accomplished in such and 
such an order, this part being formed first. 
that next, and so on in succession; and after 
a like fashion should we explain the 
evolution of all other works of nature. 
(640a33- 640b4) 2 
The conception of man, or any other animal. ..the 
conception which includes the presence of the parts 
it is best for any animal to have ...this conception is 
the final cause for that animal. We are thus brought 
back to the univocal character of the task of 
determining the origins of animals and other 
artifacts. The procedure for determining the logos 
of an artifact is the same as the procedure for 
determining the logos of any animal. Aristotle in 
fact states: 
It is plain. then. that the teaching of the old 
physiologists is inadequate, and that the 
true method is to state what the definitive 
characters are that distinguish the animal 
a~ e whole; to explein whet it is both in 
substance and in form, and to deal after the 
same fashion with its several organs; in 
fact. to proceed in exactly the same way as 
we should do, were we giving a complete 
description of a couch. (641a14-18) 
As everyone familiar with Aristotle knows, the 
doctrine of maUer and form, or more specifically 
the notion of ensouJed matter, allows him to separate 
the task of the natural philosopher in treating 
animals from the task of another philosopher 
describing the production of artifacts. Even with 
this separation, however, Aristotle still preserves 
the parallel between animals and artifacts: 
Now it is in the latter of these two senses 
(the final cause rather than the motor 
c8use) that either the whole soul or some 
part of it constitutes the nature of an 
animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence 
of the soul that enables matter to constitute 
the animal nature, much more than it is the 
presence of matter which so enables the 
soul, the inquirer into nature is bound on 
every ground to treat of the soul rather 
than of the matter. For though the wood of 
which they are made constitutes the couch 
and the tripod, it only does so because it is 
capable of receiving such and such a form. 
(641 a28-34) 
While animal and artifact differ in the location of the 
final cause--the former containing it in itself. the 
lalter receiving it from a craflsman--the operation 
of the form 8S final cause, 8S ~ remains the 
same in the artifact as in the animal. Our model for 
understanding the production of animals in nature 
remains exactly the same as the procedure for 
understanding the production of artifacts. The ~ 
informs matter according to its own necessity. This 
necessity may vary in degree according to the 
sequence of the events in the particular production. 
Thus, human souls and animal souls alike are their 
own logos, their own flnal cause. There is less 
latitude in their design than in the design of a couch, 
but the operation of the logos remains exactly the 
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same. Only the parlicular end or goal differs; only 
the sile of the ~ shifts: from the mind of lhe 
producer of the artifacl lo the soul of the Imim81. 
Wilhin the framework of the Arislolelian 
metaphysics and the methodology which il demands, 
lhe ~ holds a preeminenl posilion in defining the 
succession of necessary evenls in any produclion. 
According to Arislotle, whal we know of lhe 
origin and desllny of cats is the same general nollon 
of logos lhal we know in ourselves in following any 
procedure from restoring health lo the ill, lo building 
a house. lo giving 8 complele descriplion of the 
production of a COUCh. The logos defines the origin, 
order. means, design, and destiny. It is lheir 
principal heading. Whalthen remains of the ~ of 
animals lhal is nol defined by the metaphor of human 
productivily? 
The methodological sleps Arislolle gives in lhis 
lexl consolidale a melaphor of productivily lhal can 
be read in lwo ways. On the one hand, animals are 
like human artifacts in that their origin is 
comprehended in lerms of the idea lhal guides the 
production: the order of production is underslood in 
lerms of the besl means for executing lhe 
produclion; and the besl means is delailed in lerms 
of the gUiding Idea, the logos. On the olher hand, 
animals are like human producers in thal the final 
cause. the logos, resides inlernally, wilhin lhe 
animals lhemselves. Animals also have a soul, and 
lhough the animal's soul is morlal inslead of 
immorlal and characlerized by an inlellect lhal is 
passive inslead of active, il is ils own logos as much 
as a human is ils own final cause. 
The metaphor of productivily so dominales 
Arislolle's conceplion of the logos in lhis analysis 
lhal there is barely any difference belween lhe 
human production of an artifacl and the origin and 
composition of animals. A cal is like a couch: we 
explain the origin and desliny of cals with the same 
procedure we use lo explain the origin of furnilure. 
Animals are simullaneously producls and like lhe 
humans who produce them. and in bolh comparisons 
there is no longer a relalionship of simple analogy, Il 
is an idenlily, Animals are idenlical lo arlifacls 
because they are produced by the gUiding idea or 
logos; lhey are identical lo the arlisan in lhal they 
contain the guiding idea lhemselves. 
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The dual effecls of the melaphor of produclivily 
in Arislolle's analysis brings with il a residue of 
issues which slill remain to be decided 2300 years 
laler, While he leans lowards placing animals wilh 
arlifacts, the margin of difference separallng 
animals from eilher us or our arlifacts remains 
unclear. On the one hand. Arislolle can slale lhal 
animals are nol like producers because lhey are 
products, and on the other hand he can slate lhey are 
nol arlifactual because lhey produce lhemselves. In 
delinealing such differences each poinl of comparison 
is the alibi for the olher, and the melaphor persisls 
in emphasizing the idenlilies among ils several 
lerms. This lack of resolution in Arislolle's 
lrealmenl comes lo the fore when the elhical 
trealmenl of animals demands a decision belween 
animals inlerpreled as products or producers. 
Wilh this reading of Arislotle, a new Queslion 
emerges lhal we mighl plIir wilh Thoreau's queslion. 
Do Arislolle's methodological consideralions in De 
Parlibus Animalium help us lo fashion a case for lhe 
ethical treatmenl of animals? Or do these 
consideralions hinder us by making animals loo much 
like ourselves and our producls? In the inlervening 
hislory of philosophy and cullure whal remains of 
the Arislolelian nolion of the logos which is nol 
dominaled by the melaphor of productlvily? Are 
production and the Queslion of origin slill linked in 
lerms of some form of a guiding idea? 
I will now demonstrate lhat the lraces of this 
metaphor of produclion can be found 2300 years 
laler in the Dasein-analylic of Heidegger's Sein und 
M. In the passages where Heidegger lurns lo 
consider animals, we find ourselves immedialely in 
lhe midsl of a description of production: 
Bul the work lo be produced is nol merely 
usable for somelhing, The produclion ilself 
is a using of somelhing for somelhing. In 
the work lhere is also a reference or 
assignmenl lo 'malerials': the work is 
dependenl on lealher, lhread, needles, and 
lhe like, Lealher, moreover, is produced 
from hides. These are laken from animals, 
which someone else has raised. Animals 
also occur within the world wilhoul having 
been raised al all; and. in a way, lhese 
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entitie5 still produce them5elves even when 
they have been raised. So in the 
environment certain entities become 
accessible which are always ready-to-hand, 
but which, in themselves, do not need to be 
produced. (H70, 100):5 
In this text. Heidegger's phenomenological 
interpretation approaches animals through the roles 
they take on in those projects for the sake of which 
we labor. Our production is dependent on entities 
other than ourselves: some of which we produce, 
some which we do not produce. Heidegger then 
points out that animals "in a way" produce 
themselves. Animals are products which produce 
themselves. Before pursuing this striking 
statement, we should locate such "products" within 
Heidegger's analysis. 
In Heidegger's methodological terminology these 
entities are called "ready-to-hand" (zuhanden) in 
the world, and their being as ready-to-hand is the 
mode of our production's "discovery" of them: 
Our concernful absorption in whatever 
work-world lies closest to us, has a 
function of discovering; and it is essential 
to this function that, depending upon the 
way in which we are absorbed, those 
entities within-the-world which are brought 
along in the work and with it (that is to say, 
in the assignments or references which are 
constitutive for it) remain discoverable in 
varying degrees of explicitness and with a 
varying circumspective penetration. (H71, 
101) 
"The kind of Being which belongs to these entities 
(remember we are talking about animals along with 
other beings) is readiness-to-hand," and 
"Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as 
they are 'in themselves' are defined ontoloaico-
categorially." (Ibid,) The being of animals is 
disclosed in human productivity. Our productive 
activity. defined by that for the sake of which we 
produce. shows or exhibits animals as they are in 
themselves. 
Phenomenologically. how is this possible? 
Moving b!lckw!lrd~ through Heidegger'~ 
methodological steps, I will show that Heidegger's 
analysis goes inside Aristotle's description of 
production and generation to attempt an advance 
beyond Aristotle by demonstr21ting phenomenologi-
cally a tie between the logos and the exhibition of 
things in their being. 
Heidegger first places his own descriptive 
methodology in juxtaposition to what he takes as the 
Greeks' hermeneutic standpoint: 
The Greeks had an appropriate term for 
'Things': n¢Wa.'ta.--that is to say, that 
which one has to do within one's concernful 
dealings (npQ~ls). But ontologically, the 
specifically 'pragmatic' character of the 
n¢W01:a. is just what the Greeks left in 
obscuri ty; they thought of these 
'proximally' as 'mere Things'. (H6B, 96-
97> 
To Heidegger, Aristotle is not just any Greek, and so 
Aristotle's analysis goes one step beyond this 
pragmatic standpoint. It describes the necessity of 
the design in all beings: humans, animals, and 
artifacts. Aristotle recognized that methodology 
must be geared towards displaying this necessity so 
that the formal character of the being, the ~ may 
be described as the guiding theme. This description 
exhibits the character of the logos in a two-fold 
way: as both discourse and the internal determina-
tion of the being. Heidegger argues that Aristotle's 
goal is to blend the two: 
A6ycs 8S "discourse" means rather the 
same as !PTlAUV : to make manifest what one 
is 'talking about' in one's discourse. 
Aristotle has explicated this function of 
discourse more preci5ely 8S 
a.noq>oLVECl80:1. The A6yos let something 
be seen (!pmVECl80:I), namely what the 
discourse is about; and it does so either for 
the one who is doing the talking (the 
medium) or for persons who are talking 
with one another, as the case may be. 
(H32, 56) 
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Heidegger's reading of Aristotle is, of course, 
informed by his vision of phenomenological 
methodology. For Heidegger, logos, in both an 
Aristotelian and a phenomenological description. is 
letting something be seen. Logos is thus at once a 
medium, in the sense that it conveys what is 
manifest, and an original act, in the sense that as 
apophansis--the "letting be seen" --it takes entities 
out of their unhiddenness. showing them in their 
truth, aletheia. The Being of entities within the 
world is revealed in itself when these entities are 
taken up in the "in-order-to" and the "for the sake 
of which" of our concernful involvements. 
Heidegger's Oasein-analytic purports to reveal the 
ontological structure of Oasein's Being in the world 
in terms of the apophantical "as"; it lets Oasein be 
seen as it is in itself. Simultaneously, this 
description gives us access to the other entilles with 
which Oasein is concerned, and lets these entities be 
seen as they are in themselves. 
We thus get a description strikingly like 
Aristotle's analysis of production: "Entities still 
produce themselves even when they have been 
raised. So in the environment certain entities 
become accessible which are always ready-to-hand, 
but which. in themselves. do not need to be 
produced." (H70, 100) Aristotle defines both the 
production of artifacts and animals' own 
reproduction by the final cause: that for the sake of 
which a productive series is constituted. Heidegger 
defines our concernful absorption in whatever work-
world lies closest to us by that for the sake of which 
the work is done. This purposeful intention towards 
entities purports to serve the function of discovering 
entities ready-to-hand as they are in themselves. 
Heidegger's analysis of production, combined with 
his insights into the character of the ~ claims to 
be a development of and a movement beyond 
Aristotle and by inference a mode of access to the 
being of animals as they are in themselves. 
Given Heidegger's analysis. how might he provide 
an answer to Thoreau's question? In this analysis 
what prevents animals from becoming 'mere things' 
that (re)produce themselves which we subsequently 
take up as equipment in human production? Would 
Heidegger also use the same procedure for describing 
a cat as he would for a ,couch? Is there any 
dimension of the ~ as it comes into contact with 
the issue of animals that is independent of the motif 
of production? 
What I take to be Heidegger' s answer to these 
questions might not immediately satisfy us: our 
primary access to animals. as well as the rest of 
nature. is as equipment that (re)produces itself. 
From my reading of Aristotle's description as 
operating within the constraints of the metaphor of 
production. we might even revert to his formulation 
that animals are artifacts that are their own final 
and efficient cause. Animals are equipment with a 
soul. That is their logos. Heidegger could then be 
interpreted as adding the point that the very fact of 
the readiness-to-hand as equipment indicates that it 
has "this 'Being-in-itself' ...in which it manifests 
itself in its own right." (H69, 98) But what keeps 
this claim from simply being a reclamation and 
legitimation of Aristotle's descriptIon? 
Heidegger separates himself from Aristotle's 
notion of loaos as final cause in two principal ways. 
First, Heidegger writes: 
When considered philosophically. the ~6yos 
itself is an entity, and according to the 
orientation of ancient ontology, it is 
something present-at-hand. (HI59,201) 
As Heidegger reads him, Aristotle is undertaking a 
biological-ontical exploration of life which itself 
relles on or is founded upon an existential 
interpretation of Oasein as human. Thus, the ways in 
which entities reveal themselves as ready-to-hand 
is ontologically prior to the disclosures of entities as 
present-at-hand. In the iatter mode. we take 
entities as objects of scientific investigation. In the 
ontological analysis of the ready-to-hand, our access 
to these entities is through our experience of Being, 
workIng, and dying in the world. Any biological 
report which gives information about "living" 
reflects the fact that Oasein lives and experiences 
"life" existentially. Logos is thus tied to a human 
experience of existence, and is not an entity in its 
own right. 
Secondly, Heidegger, at least the Heidegger of 
Sein und Zeit. criticizes Aristotle for not seeing that 
the only mode of access upon which a description of 
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being:s clIn be bll:sed i:s DII:sein':s experience of Being. 
This experience forms the phenomenological context 
and the hermeneutic standpoint of the Dasein-
analytic: 
Aristotle did not pursue the analytical 
question as far as the problem of which 
phenomenon within the structure of the 
>..6yos is the one that permits and indeed 
obliges us to characterize every statement 
as synthesis and dieresis, In accordance 
with this structure, something is 
understood with regard to something: it is 
taken together with it, yet in such a way 
that this confrontation which understands 
will at the same time take apart what has 
been taken together, and will do so by 
articulating it interpretatively. If the 
phenomenon of the 'as' remains covered uP. 
and above all, if its existential source in the 
hermeneutical 'as' Is veiled, then 
Aristotle's phenomenological approach to 
the analysis of the >..6yos collapses to a 
superficial 'theory of judgment,' in which 
jUdgment becomes the binding or separating 
of representations or concepts, (H 159, 
202) 
Because Aristotle did not analyze the phenomenon of 
~ as a letting something be seen apophantically, 
as a letting something be seen as It is manifest in 
itself, he failed to see ~ as the medium by which 
the disclosure of entities takes place. He instead 
identified it as the final cause of the entity, as the 
for-the-sake-of-which of the entity, as an entity in 
its own right. 
As I read Heidegger, the difference between his 
phenomenological description and Aristotle's 
analysis is that Heidegger focuses on the locus of the 
description in Dasein's experience. and he takes that 
locus as the phenomenological point of access to the 
phenomenon to be described. Heidegger answers the 
Question: "How do we legitimately obtain the 
phenomena to be described?" 
For Heidegger what remains to be done is to work 
out the question of what it means to attain the being 
of an entity. When we comport ourselves towards 
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being:5 in lerm:s of our own productive IIctivily. we 
find ~ to be the medium by which the disclosure 
of being lakes place. The ~ Is no longer the 
revealed being as It was in Aristotle; it is now the 
medium of revelation. For Heldegger, Questions 
about ~ remain within the Seinsfrage and within 
the issue of identity posed by the grammar of the 
copula. They remain Questions which philosophy has 
yet to take up In terms of their full significance. Of 
these issues Heidegger writes: 
How far this problematic has worked its 
way Into the Interpretatton of the A6yos, 
and how far on the other hand the concept of 
'judgment' has (by a remarkable counter-
thrust) worked its way into the ontological 
problematic, is shown by the phenomenon of 
the copula. When we consider this 'bond,' it 
becomes clear that proximally the 
synthesis-structure Is regarded as self-
evident, and that it has also retained the 
function of serving as a standard for 
Interpretation. But if the formal 
characteristics of 'relating' and 'binding' 
can contribute nothing phenomenally 
towards the structural analysis of the 
>..6yos as subject matter. then in the long 
run the phenomenon to which we allude by 
the term 'copula' has nothing to do with a 
bond or binding. The Interpretation of the 
'is,' whether it be expressed in its own 
right In the language or Indicated in the 
verbal ending, leads us therefore into the 
context of problems belonging to the 
existential analytic, if assertion and the 
understanding of Being are existential 
possibilities for the Being of Dasein itself. 
When we come to work out the Question of 
Being (cf. Parl I. Division 3). we shall thus 
encounter again this peculiar phenomenon of 
Being which we meet within the >..6yos. 
(H 16, 202-203) 
In this text Heidegger defers to the later-abandoned 
third part of Sein und Zeit on precisely the issue that 
concerns us here. To what extent is an animal its 
logos. lhe final cause in its production? To what 
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extent do human acts of production grasp the logos of 
animals as either medium or entity? In answer to 
these questions, I think that Heidegger's analytic 
only improves over Aristotle's in that it 
straightforwardly acknowledges that our only access 
to the being of animals, to knowledge of their origin 
and destiny. is through the medium of our purposes, 
our for-the-sake-of-which. 
Thus I hold that Heidegger, too, uses the 
metaphor of productivity as an alibi for avoiding a 
discussion of what remains of the logos outside of 
human activities. What Heidegger calls Aristotle's 
phenomenological description attains the being of 
animals with the same procedure we would use if we 
were to give a description of a couch: the procedure 
we would use for any artifact, any piece of 
equipment. Heidagger only modifies Aristotle's 
approach slightly by pointing out that our mode of 
access to entities in the world is through our 
intentions and projects. We attain the being of 
animals as they are in themselves by disclosing them 
as equipment. Logos, whether in Aristotle or in 
Heidegger, remains a distinctly human phenomenon; 
it remains a metaphor of design imbedded in the 
human actiVity of production. 
Of course the question arises, "Does a logos for 
animals remain which is not defined by our species 
or attained for renection through the purposes of our 
species?" Thoreau's challenge to us as philosophers 
thus remains. Do cats have an origin and destiny 
outside the human domain of meaning, purposes, 
procedures. and productivity? Every cat owner, of 
course, has the suspicion they do. 
In Heidegger's text, such questions are 
acknowledged. but only as an unfinished remainder of 
the Oasein-analytic. Heidegger states that it would 
be interesting to raise the question of the Oasein of 
animals. but this is a very difficult matter. He even 
closes the subject of animals by asking, "It remains 
a problem in itself to define ontologically the way in 
which the senses can be stimulated or touched in 
something that merely has life, and how and where 
the Being of animals. for instance. is constituted by 
some kind of 'time'." (Ibid.) This quote is 
reminiscent of the lack of resolution that I found in 
Aristotle. Again it is appropriate to ask if there is a 
margin of difference that separates animals from 
Between the Species 
either us or our prodUcts? Much like the problems 
the phenomenon of 't6yos implies for the existential 
analytic. these questions about animals are a 
supplement to the text that was never written, 
literally an untouched remainder of the logos. 
The dominance of the vocabulary of production 
guided by logos in Aristotle's and Heidegger's 
discussions of the being of animals makes Thoreau's 
Question all the more a spur to our philosophizing. In 
response to Thoreau's question we should ask. 
"What kind of philosophy is it that asks questions 
about the origin and destiny of cats as a way of 
measuring the success of philosophy?" The answer J 
have found is that it is a philosophy that searches for 
reasons and causes tn being Itself. to the end of 
discovering the origin of beings. It is a philosophy 
that searches for the logos. This search. in the 
texts I have taken up here, takes place within the 
framework of the gUiding motif of production. 
When we push the issue further and ask what 
remains of the ]ogos--whether understood as entity 
or medium--of animals which is not dominated by the 
motif of production, we find in both Aristotle and 
Heidegger that the being of animals is constituted as 
a lack. In the passage just quoted from Heidegger. 
animals are explicitly described as "something that 
merely has life." May we also presume then that 
animals have no projects or acts of production for 
the sake of which their actions are done? Heidegger 
would certainly say. "Not in an existential or 
historical sense." Looking at the same issue in 
Aristotle we find that while animals have a soul 
which allows them to be their own final cause, it is a 
soul which lacks an agent intellect. Again we find 
that the ~ of animals is defined in terms of lack. 
What remains of the logos which is not governed 
by the metaphor of production? The answer I find in 
the texts of Aristotle and the early Heidegger is that 
this remainder is not lacking but is itself conceived 
in terms of a lack. This lack is doubly unresolved: 
animals lack the requisites to be either human 
producers or to be pure products. We nei ther 
produce them nor do they produce. and all the while 
we attempt to comprehend them within this 
paradigm. 
I would like to close with a provisional renection 
on the import of these observations for the study of 
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ethics and animals. Both the meaning of log05 in the 
Aristotelian notion of the source of the productive 
design that is common to both human and animal souls 
and the Heideggerian description of the medium by 
which the design is exhibited place the logic of 
arguments that seek ethical clarification about 
animals in a double-bind. Most, if not all, inquiries 
about ethics and animals remain within the 
understanding determined by the metaphor of 
production. While we attempt to investigate issues 
of the morality and immorality of our behavior 
towards animals as means to our productive ends. 
we simultaneously strain to escape the gravitational 
pull of the metaphor of production and establish an 
ethics for animals outside of human activity. This 
argument transcends the standpoints of utilitarian 
and deontological views because ethics is always the 
consideration of the behavior of moral agents, and 
moral agents are always productive agents. We can 
of course ask, "Are the human ends which subsume 
animals as means moral or immoral?" But when we 
ask, "Are the actions of animals--whether raised in 
captivity or found in nature--subject to standards of 
justice?" only our Question remains. 
The study of ethics and animals, then, seems to 
become a matter of both judging our own actions 
towards animals and exempting animals from the 
standards for our behavior. When we doubt the 
morality of making animals the means to our 
productive ends. we have to exempt animals from 
the obligations of an autonomous and rational moral 
agent as we simultaneously grant them that same 
status. This paradox is the manifestation in ethics of 
the same unresolved double-bind within which we 
found Aristotle and Heidegger when they concluded 
that animals are products which produce themselves. 
We transfer to animals our own privileged status of 
an end-in-itself without granting that animals are 
capable of moral action. Here, too, we find a lack: 
animals lack the capacity for moral obligations. The 
result is that we share half our human status with 
them: animals have a moral status but without the 
simultaneous acknowledgment that the ends or goals 
of animals are subject to moral imperatives. 
Thoreau himself might have attempted an 
argument that would guide us out of this ethical bind. 
Starting from the premise that "All good things are 
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wild and free," we could, by an action of 
sympathetic imagination, will for animals the 
metaphor which conditions our understanding of 
ourselves: the capacity to produce and the individual 
determination of origin and destiny. Along this line 
we could argue that animals are, like us, capable of 
producing themselves. Not knowing the origin and 
destiny of cats, philosophical speculation can at least 
posit the condition for there to be an origin and 
destiny independent of human ends. We will not grant 
that animals are capable of moral action, but we will 
grant them the rights of independent moral agents. 
Still. they continue to be t8ken up as melms to our 
ends. 
The ethical consideration of the treatment of 
animals disintegrates as it is pushed towards its 
ground. Ethical arguments determine the status of 
animals within the framework of a metaphor of 
productivity. The protection of animals in 
sanctuaries and preserves illustrates the double-bind 
of this logic. We establish "kingdoms" or preserves 
or laws intended for some few of them to pursue 
their own ends. Doing this for some, however, is not 
the same as doing the same for all, and the perceived 
interests of a productive society prohibit the 
categorical application of the protectionist's 
standpoint. Even if we match our own origins to that 
of animals in a modification of Darwin's hypothesis 
of a planet-wide evolutionary system, this 
hypothesis only aggravates Thoreau's Question by 
first establishing a common conception of an 
evolutionary ground which we have already 
determined as our mutual origin and. second, by 
deeming the Question of destiny irrelevant in light of 
natural selection and historical accident. Thoreau's 
question both cites and is situated in an unaddressed 
remainder in our philosophical tasks: to Question the 
metaphor of the productive agent that guides our 
thinking, to say nothing of the origin and destiny of 
cats. 
NOTES 
1. Aristotle, The Parts of Animals, translated by 
A.l. Peck, with a foreword by F.H.A. Martin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937), 
Between the Species 
-Nothing of the Origin end Destiny of eels: The Remeinder of the logos 
2. Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle. translated 
in English under the editorship of J.A. Smith and W.D. 
Ross. Vol. V De Partibus Animaljym (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press. 1912). All subsequent references 
to Aristotle are from this edition. 
3. Martin Heldegger. Being and Time. translated 
by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1962). 
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